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Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive
Legal Writing

by Michael R. Smith*
The role of metaphor in the law has been a hot topic among legal
scholars in recent years.1 In fact, recent scholarly works on metaphor
in the law (and the more general works on metaphor that have served
as their basis) have addressed the topic from the standpoints of
numerous disciplines, including linguistics,2 philosophy,3 rhetoric,4

* Professor of Law and Director of Legal Writing, University of Wyoming College of
Law. Florida State University (B.S., 1982); University of Florida (J.D., 1985). Member,
State Bars of California and Florida; Legal Writing Institute (Board of Directors, 20062010); Association of Legal Writing Directors (Board of Directors, 2003-2005). © Michael
R. Smith, 2007.
1. For an extensive list of articles and books on or relevant to the role of metaphor in
legal discourse, see Appendix A of this Article.
2. See, for example, the various works by linguist and cognitive psychologist George
Lakoff, many of which have been cited in legal scholarship on the role of metaphor in the
law. Professor Lakofis works in this area include METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with
Mark Johnson); WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT

THE MIND (1987); MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO POETIC METAPHOR (1989)
(with Mark Turner); MORAL POLITICS: How LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (1996);
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN
THOUGHT (1999) (with Mark Johnson); DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT: KNOW YOUR VALUES
AND FRAME THE DEBATE-THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004); THINKING
POINTS: COMMUNICATING OUR AMERICAN VALUES AND VISION (2006).

3. See, for example, the various works by philosophy professor Mark Johnson, many
of which have been cited in legal scholarship on the role of metaphor in the law. Professor
Johnson's works in this area include METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (with George Lakoff);
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON METAPHOR (Mark Johnson ed., 1981); THE BODY IN THE
MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION,

AND REASON

(1987);

MORAL

IMAGINATION: IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE FOR ETHICS (1993); PHILOSOPHY IN THE
FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT (1999) (with

George Lakoff).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL H. FROST, Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, in
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE 85 (2005); MICHAEL R.
SMITH, The Power of Metaphor and Simile in Persuasive Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL
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cognitive psychology,' and literary theory.6 Because of these vastly
different approaches to the topic, however, much of the literature on
metaphor in the law is difficult to reconcile. Moreover, while these
scholarly works have increased lawyers' appreciation and understanding
of the prevalence and power of metaphor in legal discourse, the absence
of some type of organizational scheme has made it difficult for legal
advocates to harness this power so that it can be used in their everyday
practices.
This Article, then, has two primary goals. First, this Article attempts
to reconcile some of the approaches to the topic of "metaphor and the
law" by identifying different "levels" of metaphor operating in legal
analysis and writing.7 A close reading of the scholarship reveals that
there are actually four basic types or levels of metaphor operating in
persuasive legal discourse. These four levels of metaphor correspond
with the four basic components of any legal argument: (1) the legal
principles governing an issue; (2) the tools of analysis applied to the
governing principles; (3) the writing style of an advocate who is
presenting the legal argument; and (4) the inherent nature of language
itself, which serves as the foundation of any written legal argument.
The fact that metaphor plays a significant role in all four of these
components of legal argumentation highlights the sheer prevalence of
metaphor in legal discourse. The four levels of metaphor discussed here
will be presented generally in descending order, starting with those
types of metaphor that play the most significant roles in the decisionmaking process and working down. The following is a summary of the
four levels of metaphor that will be discussed:

WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 179, 179 (2002) [hereinafter

SMITH, The Power of Metaphor].
5. See, for example, the various works by law professor Steven L. Winter, such as A
CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001); The Metaphorof Standingand the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); The Cognitive Dimension of the
Agon Between Legal Powerand NarrativeMeaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter, The Cognitive Dimension]; Transcendental Nonsense, MetaphoricReasoning,
and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL R. SMITH, The Functions of Literary References in Persuasive
Writing: A Multidisciplinary Analysis, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND
STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE WRITING 9, 15-30 (2002) (discussing "Literary References for
Nonthematic Metaphoric Comparison").
7. Admittedly, to say that an abstract concept like metaphor can be broken down into
"levels" is itself a metaphor.
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Level 1-Doctrinal Metaphors
Level 2-Legal Method Metaphors
Level 3--Stylistic Metaphors
Level 4-Inherent Metaphors
The second, and more practical, goal of this Article is to analyze the
specific implications of these four levels of metaphor on the practice of
persuasive legal writing. While most of the recent scholarship on
metaphor has made it clear that metaphors are more than mere
rhetorical or literary devices,' these works do not diminish the importance of metaphor to legal rhetoricians. To the contrary, the more the
legal profession learns about metaphors, the more opportunities exist for
legal advocates to develop rhetorical strategies around them. Thus,
while this Article acknowledges that metaphors are more than rhetorical
devices, it nevertheless demonstrates that metaphors, more than ever,
can and do serve as the basis for numerous rhetorical strategies.
I.
A.

LEVEL ONE: DOCTRINAL METAPHORS

Defining Doctrinal Metaphors

The first category-or level--of metaphor implicated by the existing
"law and metaphor" literature is what I call "doctrinal metaphor." This
level of metaphor refers to aspects of doctrinal law that are expressed in
metaphoric terms. Many of the legal rules and principles governing the
analysis of an issue are expressed in the form of a metaphor. In fact,
doctrinal law is rife with metaphoric constructs. 9 Consider the following
recognizable examples:

8. See, for example, the numerous works by George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and Steven
Winter cited in supra notes 2, 3, and 5, respectively. See also Linda L. Berger, What is the
Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can Help
Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRIrING DIRECTORS 169, 170 (2004). Berger
writes,
[C]ognitive theory of metaphor... reconstructs the foundation in which metaphor
was seen as merely literary or rhetorical in contrast with the "real" literal and
scientific world. In cognitive theory, metaphor is not only a way of seeing or
saying; it is a way of thinking and knowing, the method by which we structure
and reason, and it is fundamental, not ornamental.

Id.
9. Related to doctrinal metaphors
expressed in the form of metaphor, such
the floodgates of litigation" argument.
Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in

are some standard policy arguments that are
as the "slippery slope" argument and the "opening
See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates:
Appellate Briefs, 62 MoNT. L. REV. 59, 73 (2001).
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The "marketplace of ideas" principle in First Amendment

* The "wall of separation" principle in connection with the law
on the separation of church and state under the First Amendment;"
* The "overbreadth" doctrine under constitutional law; 2
* The "chilling effect" doctrine under constitutional law;"
* Treating a corporation as a "person" under the law; 4
*The relationship between "parent corporations" and subsidiaries and "piercing the corporate veil" under corporations law; 5
* The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine under criminal law
and evidence law;' 6
* "Long arm" statutes under personal jurisdiction law. 7

10.

For a comprehensive discussion of the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor, see HAIG

BOSMAJIAN, The Metaphoric"Marketplaceof Ideas," in METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL
OPINIONS 49, 49-72 (1992).

11. For a comprehensive discussion of the "wall of separation" metaphor, see HAIG
BOSMAJIAN, The Metaphoric "Wall of Separation"between Church and State in METAPHOR
AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 73, 73-94 [hereinafter BOSMAJIAM, Wall of Separation].

12. For a comprehensive discussion of the "overbreadth" metaphor, see HAIG
BOSMAJIAN, The Metaphoric "Chilling Effect" and Related Tropes, in METAPHOR AND
REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS, 95, 110-16.

13. For a comprehensive discussion of the "chilling effect" metaphor, see id. at 95-110.
14. For a comprehensive discussion of the "corporation as person" metaphor, see
generally Berger, supra note 8 (citing numerous other works on this topic).
15. See generally, e.g., Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinning the Blame & Piercing the Veil in
the Mists of Metaphor: The Supreme Court's New Standardsfor the CERCLA Liability of
ParentCompanies and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 115 (1998).
16. See, e.g., Jennifer Diana, Note, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers,the
Sixth Amendment, and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985
(2005). Diana writes,
Derivative evidence or, more commonly, "fruits," refers to evidence one step
removed from illegally obtained evidence, as opposed to the evidence that resulted
directly from a constitutional violation. The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of
either form of evidence. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) .... As a tool
to determine whether a particular piece of evidence derived from an initial
illegality, the Court coined the metaphor "fi-uit of the poisonous tree." See
Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341.
Id. at 986 n.8.
17. See, e.g., Jerome A. Hoffman, Recognition By Courts in the Eleventh Circuit of
Judgments Rendered By Courts of Other Countries, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 65 (1999). Hoffman
writes,
Speakers and writers often use the metaphorically evocative term "reach" when
considering the authority of courts to render judgments enforceable (1) for or
against the parties named therein, (2) for or against interests claimed in property
named therein, or (3) for or against interests claimed in statuses borne or shared
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Without a doubt, doctrinal metaphors are the most powerful-and
potentially the most dangerous-metaphors operating in legal discourse.
In these contexts, substantive legal rights are expressed, analyzed, and
argued not in literal terms, but in figurative, symbolic, and metaphoric
terms. Granted, metaphoric language can be useful for describing or
expressing an abstract legal concept. In fact, it is the ability of
metaphor to "give names to nameless things"'s-to put an abstraction
into concrete terms-that has led to the prevalence of metaphor in
doctrinal law. However, a metaphor cannot possibly capture the true
meaning of, and all the dimensions and nuances implicated by, an
abstract legal concept.' 9 Indeed, it is this allure of metaphor combined
with its potential pitfalls that led renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo to
his famous criticism of metaphors in doctrinal law: "Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it." 20 And it is this criticism, and the
shortcomings of metaphor that it reflects, that lead us to our first
rhetorical metaphoric strategy: challenging an established doctrinal
metaphor.
B.

Advocacy Strategy with DoctrinalMetaphors: The Cardozo Attack

As discussed in the preceding section, many rules of law and legal
principles are expressed in metaphoric terms. As we also saw, the
ability of a metaphor to accurately and effectively capture and reflect a
legal abstraction is questionable. Thus, the first metaphoric strategy
available to the legal advocate is to challenge an unfavorable doctrinal
metaphor, a strategy I have dubbed the "Cardozo Attack."
Many legal advocates represent clients on issues that implicate
doctrinal metaphors. If a lawyer finds that his or her client would not
fare well under the established doctrinal metaphor, one strategy that
may be available to the lawyer is to challenge the metaphor itself. That
is, the lawyer may be able to convince the court to adopt a new (and
more favorable) governing rule by arguing that the existing doctrinal
metaphor is defective because it does not accurately and effectively
capture the legal concept at issue. A lawyer in this situation may

by persons named therein. As a colorful example of the metaphor, we customarily
refer to those statutory grants ofjudicial authority to affect the in personam rights
of persons beyond a recipient court's territorial jurisdiction as "long-arm" statutes.
Id. at 135 n.356.
18. ARISTOTLE, THE RHEToRIc OF ARISTOTLE 188 (Lane Cooper trans., Appleton
Century Crofts 1932).
19. See, e.g., SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 216-17.
20. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
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advocate either for a new "literal" rule or for a new metaphoric rule that
(in the opinion of the advocate) more effectively captures the legal
abstraction (i.e., fighting metaphor with metaphor).2 '
Numerous illustrations of successful attacks on doctrinal metaphors
exist. We will consider two.
1. Replacing a Factors Test for the "Alter Ego" Doctrine for
"Piercing the Corporate Veil" Under Corporations Law. The first
example of a successful challenge to a doctrinal metaphor stems from
Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's statement itself. Justice Cardozo's earlier
quoted admonishment about metaphors was given in the context of
corporations law and the "mists of metaphor" that "envelop" the
relationship between parent corporations and subsidiary corporations.2 2
Justice Cardozo warned that metaphors such as "alias" and "dummy,"
which often dominate the discussion of whether a parent corporation will
be held responsible for the obligations of its subsidiary, should be
employed carefully and not to the exclusion of literal language that more
accurately expresses the proper relationship between such corporations.23
Justice Cardozo's warning has had a major impact on the development
of corporations law in many jurisdictions around the country. In fact,
based in large part on Justice Cardozo's warning, 24 many courts have
abandoned the traditional doctrinal metaphors used to analyze the
limitations on a corporation's liability-"piercing the corporate veil,"
"alter ego," "alias," "dummy," "instrumentality," "fiction"--and have

21. For a discussion of this and related advocacy strategies see Berger, supra note 8,
at 204-08.
22. Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61.
23. Id. Justice Cardozo's full quote reads as follows:
The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations
is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate entity will be ignored when the
parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough if the picturesqueness of
the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential term to be defined is the
act of operation. Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by
the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an
agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and
justice.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).

24. Using key terms from Justice Cardozo's quote as search terms, a Westlaw or Lexis
search of case law databases reveals numerous cases in which courts evoke this quote in
the context of abandoning the old corporate metaphors in favor of literal rules.
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replaced them with literal rules (such as factor tests 25 ) that more
accurately assess the legitimacy of the corporation's relationships and
existence.2" One example of such a case is Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc.,27
in which the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted a
nineteen-factor test for determining whether to disregard the corporate
entity in a particular case.28 In establishing this rule, the court in
Laya acknowledged the limitations of the traditional corporate law
metaphors and paid appropriate homage to Justice Cardozo:
Examination of the numerous relevant factors in a "totality of the
circumstances" test provides a more enlightening analysis than merely
applying metaphors, like "simulacrum," "alter ego," "instrumentality,"
etc., to describe the unity of the shareholder(s) and the corporation
justifying, where equitable, the piercing of the corporate veil in the
case.
In discussing the concept of piercing the corporate veil to hold the
parent corporation liable for the debts of its subsidiary corporation, the
renowned Benjamin N. Cardozo, then Chief Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals, remarked that this concept "is still enveloped in the
mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting
as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving
29
it."

2. Dismantling the "Wall of Separation" Between Church and
State and Replacing it with the "Lemon Test." A second example
of a successful attack on a doctrinal metaphor has been well chronicled
by author and communications professor Haig Bosmajian and involves
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 30 The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion."3 This provision
in the Constitution is generally designed to prevent states and the
federal government from enacting laws that favor one religion over
another, that favor the religious over the nonreligious, or that otherwise

25. As we will see later, "factor tests" themselves are a form of metaphor. See infra
notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
26. See generally 18 AM. JuR. 2D Corporations§§ 46-54 (2004 & Supp. 2006) (discussing
theories for disregarding the corporate entity and listing the numerous factors modern
courts consider in making this determination).
27. 352 S.E.2d 93 (W. Va. 1986).
28. Id. at 98-99.
29. Id. at 99 & n.4 (quoting Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61).
30. See BOSMAJIAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11, at 73-94.
31.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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punish or favor people for having or not having certain religious
beliefs.32
As Professor Bosmajian points out, the United States Supreme Court,
in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education Ewing Township,3
established a doctrinal metaphor that was designed to guide state and
federal courts' analysis of Establishment Clause issues.8 4 In Everson,
the Court, speaking through Justice Black, held that "[t]he First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall
must be kept high and impregnable.""5
After Everson, courts generally used the wall of separation metaphor
as a guiding principle for interpreting and applying the Establishment
Clause.36
In many cases, however, an absolute division between
government and church proved to be unworkable as courts began to
recognize that some relationship between the government and religion
was inevitable. Soon, some federal judges and legal scholars, unhappy
with the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence under
Everson, began to attack the "wall" metaphor by criticizing its inability
to accurately reflect the literal and nuanced relationship between church
and state. Here is a sampling of such criticisms presented by Professor
Bosmajian:
1962-Justice Stewart dissenting in Engel v. Vitale:37 "I
think that the Court's task, in this as in all areas of constitutional
adjudication, is not responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of
metaphors like the 'wall of
separation,' a phrase nowhere to be
3
found in the Constitution. 8
. 1963-Justice Stewart dissenting in Abington School District
v. Schempp :3 "The short of the matter is simply that the two
relevant clauses of the First Amendment cannot accurately be
reflected in a sterile metaphor which by its very nature may distort
rather than illumine the problems involved in a particular case. " "

32. 16A AM. JuR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 417 (1998 & Supp. 2006).
33. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
34. See BOSMAIAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11, at 77-78.
35. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; see also BOSMAJIAN, Wall of Separation, supra note 11, at
78.
36. See generally BOSMAIAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11, at 78.
37. 370 U.S. 421, 444-46 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (school prayer case).
38. Id. at 445-46.
39. 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (school prayer case).

40. Id. at 309.
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1963-Robert Hutchins: "The wall has done what walls
usually do: it has obscured the view ....
The wall is offered as a
reason. It is not a reason; it is a figure of speech."41
In the face of such criticism, the Supreme Court, in the 1971 case of
Lemon v. Kurtzman,42 established a new three-part test for evaluating
whether a governmental action is constitutional under the Establishment Clause.4
Under the Lemon test, the challenged governmental
action (1) must have a secular purpose; (2) must have a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) must not foster
excessive government entanglement with religion. 44 In establishing
this test, a majority of the Court formally recognized the limitations of
the wall of separation metaphor:
Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and
state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable .... Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize
that the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of
a particular relationship.'
Since 1971, the Lemon test has served as the primary rule for
evaluating Establishment Clause issues. 46
Nevertheless, Justice
Cardozo's warning and the limitations of the wall metaphor were
revisited in 1985 when Justice Rehnquist dissented in Wallace v.
Jaffree,4 7 a case involving an Alabama statute that established "a
period of silence ... for 'meditation or voluntary prayer'" in public

schools :41
Notwithstanding the absence of a historical basis for this theory of
rigid separation, the wall idea might well have served as a useful albeit
misguided analytical concept, had it led this Court to unified and

41. Robert M. Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND
H. Oaks ed., 1963).

STATE 17, 19 (Dallen

42. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
43. Id. at 612-13; see also BOSMAJILAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11, at 84-85.
44. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13; see also BOSMAJIAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11,
at 84-85. Interestingly, the third part of the Lemon test itself contains a metaphor:
"excessive government entanglement." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
45. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614; see also BOSMAJIAN, Wall of Separation,supra note 11, at

85.
46. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 419 (1998 & Supp. 2006).
47. 472 U.S. 38, 106-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

48. 472 U.S. at 40.
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principled results in Establishment Clause cases. The opposite,
unfortunately, has been true; in the 38 years since Everson our
Establishment Clause cases have been neither principled nor unified.
Our recent opinions, many of them hopelessly divided pluralities, have
with embarrassing candor conceded that the "wall of separation" is
merely a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier," which "is not
wholly accurate" and can only be "dimly perceived."
Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless as a guide to
sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrates only too well the
wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation that "[mietaphors in law are
to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it."4 9

Thus, here are presented two examples of successful attacks on
doctrinal metaphors: one in the context of corporations law and one in
the context of constitutional law. The shift in corporate liability law
away from its traditional alter ego and related metaphors and the shift
in the Establishment Clause jurisprudence away from the wall of
separation metaphor demonstrate in dramatic fashion how metaphoric
rules can be changed. Regardless of whether the changes in these
instances were brought about by the courts themselves or by advocates
who faced unfavorable doctrinal metaphors, these illustrations nevertheless demonstrate that courts can be convinced to reassess established
doctrinal metaphors and, if appropriate, abandon them for rules that
more accurately reflect the reality of the legal issue at hand. Thus, legal
advocates should watch for doctrinal metaphors that may be implicated
by their clients' issues. And if a legal advocate finds that his or her
client would not fare well under an applicable doctrinal metaphor, the
advocate should consider whether the metaphoric rule can be challenged
via a Cardozo Attack.
II.
A.

LEVEL TWO: LEGAL METHOD METAPHORS

Defining Legal Method Metaphors

The second level of metaphor relevant to persuasive legal writing is
"legal method metaphor." This category of metaphor refers to concepts
of legal method and legal analysis that are expressed in metaphoric

49. Id. at 106-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61) (footnotes
and citations omitted); see also BOSMAJIAN, Wall of Separation, supra note 11, at 87-88.
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terms. Many of the analytical tools used to reason through legal issues
are metaphoric constructs. Consider these examples:"°
' "parts" or "elements" of a rule-to say that an abstract rule
can be broken down into "parts" or "elements" to be separately
analyzed is a metaphoric concept.
* "balancing" or "weighing" tests-to say that a legal issue is
resolved by "weighing" or "balancing" a number of "factors" is also
metaphoric.
* "narrow" or "broad" construction-arguing that a legal rule
can be interpreted "narrowly" or "broadly" is evoking a metaphor.
. the "spirit behind a rule"-the idea that a rule has a "spirit"
that can be appealed to is also a metaphoric idea.
Although lawyers often use such legal method metaphors reflexively
or unthinkingly, they are nonetheless metaphoric constructs. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of these metaphoric tools in the analysis of legal
issues in all areas of the law makes them extremely important and
relevant to all legal advocates.
The above examples of legal method metaphors include references to
elements, factors, and balancing tests. Because element tests, factor
tests, and balancing tests can formally be made part of doctrinal law by
legislatures or by courts,5 ' one can easily confuse legal method metaphors with doctrinal metaphors (i.e., Level 1 metaphors) in these
contexts.
Legal method metaphors are different from doctrinal
metaphors in the sense that in the context of legal method metaphors,
the rule itself is not metaphoric (or at least does not have to be); rather
the tools used to analyze or apply the rule are metaphoric. Legal method
metaphors, then, do not include court-established or court-acknowledged
"factor tests" or "element tests" or the like, which technically are generic
forms of doctrinal metaphors."

50. This list of legal method metaphors is derived generally from JAMES B. WHITE, THE
LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION 695
(1973).
51. See, e.g., LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION 18-22 (4th ed. 2006) (discussing common doctrinal rule structures that lawyers often
work with, such as factor tests and balancing tests).
52. In my advanced legal writing textbook, I offer this example of an established "factor
test" from Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989):
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee [as opposed to an
independent contractor] under the general common law of agency, we consider the
hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill
required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has
the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired

930

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

Legal method metaphors occur when a lawyer or a judge comes across
a legal rule and independently employs (or advocates for the employment
of) a metaphoric construct to that rule. Legal method metaphors are
tools and strategies applied to a rule. If the rule itself expressly states
that it is a factor or balancing test, it is a doctrinal metaphor, and all a
lawyer is asked to do is apply the established metaphoric construct to
the facts at hand.
B. Advocacy Strategy with Legal Method Metaphors:Arguing for a
FavorableLegal Method Metaphor
Legal method metaphors were defined above as tools of legal analysis
expressed in metaphoric terms. A fairly obvious strategy that flows from
this definition, then, is for a legal advocate who is arguing a legal issue
to a court to propose to the court a legal method metaphor that favors
the advocate's client.53 Such strategies, in fact, are commonplace.
Whenever, for example, a legal advocate argues for a "narrow" or "broad"
interpretation of a rule (whichever is more advantageous to the
advocate's client), the advocate-whether he or she knows it or not-is
employing, and arguing for the court to employ, a favorable legal method
metaphor. Consider this more elaborate example:
Hypothetical Fact Pattern: In the fictitious state of Lincoln, the
defendant hung a brick with a rope from a bridge over a road in the
path of traffic. A truck ran into the brick, and the truck's windshield
was broken. The driver of the truck and his passenger were injured.
The defendant was arrested and charged with violating Lincoln Statute
section 123.01, which reads as follows:
Whoever, wantonly or maliciously, throws, hurls, or projects any stone
or other hard substance that is capable of producing death or great
bodily harm at, within, or into any occupied vehicle, including any
automobile, truck, or bus, or any occupied train, cable railway car,
street railway car, or monorail car, or any occupied boat, vessel, ship,

party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the
regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the
provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."
MICHAEL R. SMITH, The Quest for Coherence and the Creationof FactorTests in Persuasive
Legal Writing, in ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING: THEORIES AND STRATEGIES IN PERSUASIVE

WRITING 285, 289 (2002) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non.Violence, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
Because this factor test for determining whether a hired party is an employee has been
established as the rule by the Court, it is a generic type of doctrinal metaphor, rather than
a legal method metaphor.
53. See generally, e.g., id. at 285-309 (discussing how, as a strategy of advocacy, a

lawyer can create and propose to a court a new "factors test").
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or barge lying in or plying the waters of this state, or any occupied
aircraft flying through the airspace of this state shall be guilty of a
felony of the second degree. 4
Defendant's Strategy-An "Elements Test" Metaphor: Advocating for a
favorable legal method metaphor, the attorney for the defendant is likely
to argue that the language of section 123.01 can be "broken down" into
"parts" or "elements," all of which must be established by the State. One
such element, according to the defendant's counsel, is the requirement
that the object in question be "thrown, hurled, or projected." In the
present case, the defendant did not throw, hurl, or project the brick at
the victims' truck; rather he merely placed it in the truck's path. Thus,
the attorney is likely to argue, the State cannot establish an essential
"element" of the statute, and consequently, the defendant's actions do not
fall within the language of the statute.
The Prosecutor's Strategy-The 'Broad Interpretation"and "Spiritof
the Rule" Metaphors: The prosecuting attorney, on the other hand, is
likely to argue two favorable legal method metaphors of his or her own:
that the word "project" in the statute should be interpreted "broadly" and
that the "spirit" of section 123.01 dictates a finding that the defendant's
actions come under the statute.
First, the prosecutor is likely to argue that the word "project" should
be interpreted broadly to include the action of projecting an object into
the path of a moving truck. While the most common meaning of the
word "project" is to "throw or cast forward,"5 it also can mean "to cause
to protrude."5 6 Thus, a broad interpretation of this word would include
the action, like that of the defendant, of causing an object to protrude
into the path of a moving vehicle.
Second, the prosecutor is likely to argue that such a broad interpretation is consistent with the spirit of section 123.01. The language of the
statute makes it clear that it is designed to protect occupied conveyances. In this regard, the prosecutor is likely to point out that all of the
items designed to be protected under the statute are capable of
movement (automobiles, trucks, buses, trains, boats, and planes) and
that the statute applies only if such items are "occupied." The prosecutor is also likely to point out that there are two ways that a hard object
can come in contact with an occupied conveyance: (1) a person could
throw or hurl an object at the target or (2) a person could place an object
in the path of the moving target. Thus, the prosecutor is likely to argue

54. This fictitious statute is based loosely on FLA. STAT. § 790.19 (2006).
55. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 913 (1981).
56. Id.
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that the defendant's conduct is exactly the type of conduct section 123.01
is designed to address and that a broad interpretation of the word
"project" would be consistent with the spirit of the statute.
As one can tell from these illustrations, arguing for a favorable legal
method metaphor is nothing new for legal advocates. Attorneys make
these kinds of arguments all the time; they are an ingrained part of
legal practice. What legal advocates may not appreciate, however, is
that such strategies are actually metaphoric strategies. To argue that
a rule has required elements, or that a rule should be interpreted
broadly, or that a certain interpretation of a rule is consistent with the
spirit of the rule, is to impose a metaphoric construct onto a rule.
Granted, because lawyers regularly employ these types of metaphors
already, it is unlikely that this discussion of legal method metaphors will
have a practical effect on how lawyers approach their cases. Perhaps,
however, it will increase lawyers' appreciation of the sheer prevalence
of metaphor in legal advocacy.
LEVEL THREE: STYLISTIC METAPHORS
The previous two categories of metaphor--doctrinal metaphors and
legal method metaphors-implicated substantive strategies (as opposed
to writingstyle strategies) for legal advocates. In the context of doctrinal
metaphors, we saw how a legal advocate could, as a substantive legal
strategy, challenge an existing doctrinal rule expressed in the form of a
metaphor. Similarly, in the context of legal method metaphors, we saw
how a legal advocate, as a substantive strategy, could argue for a
favorable metaphoric construct to be applied to the rule governing the
analysis of the issue at hand. Such metaphoric strategies are substantive strategies because they affect the substantive content of an
advocate's argument.
The third level of metaphor, by contrast, involves the use of metaphors
in one's writing style. That is, this level of metaphor focuses on different
types of metaphors an advocate can use as part of his or her writing
style. Whereas the first two levels of metaphor that were discussed
affect "what is said" by an advocate, the third level of metaphor relates
to "how it is said."
That being said, however, readers of this Article should not be misled
by the term "stylistic" in this context. The metaphoric strategies that
will be discussed in this section are stylistic in the sense that they
reflect writing style choices made by an advocate in writing a brief or
other form of persuasive document. The word "stylistic," however, does
not and should not imply that these types of metaphor are mere
ornamentation or adornment or that they lack legitimate rhetorical
power. To the contrary, as we will see, these types of metaphors serve
III.
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numerous rhetorical functions and, if used correctly, can be very
powerful in legal advocacy. In this section, we will discuss two general
subcategories of stylistic metaphors: "metaphoric themes" and "pointspecific stylistic metaphors."
A.

Metaphoric Themes

The first subcategory of stylistic metaphors is the concept of a
metaphoric theme. A metaphoric theme is a stylistic persuasive writing
strategy in which the discussion of several points in a legal argument
(such as a court brief) revolves around a consistent theme that is
metaphoric in nature. Stated another way, a metaphoric theme is a
recurring or extended metaphor that serves as the theme behind a set
of different points in a legal argument.57
Because the theme of an argument pervades the argument and can be
fully appreciated only by reading the argument as a whole, it is difficult
to provide a clear example of metaphoric theme. In his textbook on legal
writing, however, Professor Charles R. Calleros briefly describes an
example of a metaphoric theme in which an "attorney used the metaphor
of a lawless
frontier to convey a theme in a motion for summary
5

judgment":

The motion for summary judgment challenged an arbitration
decision interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, a decision to
which a reviewing court would grant substantial deference. Accordingly, the author of the brief bore the burden of showing that even that
deferential standard of review imposed meaningful limits on the
arbitrator's interpretation and that the arbitrator had exceeded those
limits as a matter of law. Throughout the brief, the author argued
those points with sound analysis of the law and facts and with
traditional policy arguments. But the author of the brief wanted to
create a mood as well, and the case itself invited the author to draw
allusions to unrestrained frontier justice in the lawless Wild West: The
workplace was a coal mine, and the arbitrator's last name was West.
To introduce this theme, the first sentence of the argument suggested
that failure to curb the arbitrator's discretion would render labor
relations as chaotic and lawless as in some frontier outpost in the Wild
West:
Despite the deference arbitrators are granted in reaching their
decisions, one principle stands clear: the federal labor policy of
promoting arbitration of industrial disputes does not create a

57. See CHARLEs R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WarriNG 329-30 (4th ed. 2002).

58. Id. at 329. Professor Calleros credits this example of a thematic metaphor to
Christopher Mason, an attorney with the Phoenix office of the law firm of Bryan Cave LLP.
Id. at 329 n.4.
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lawless frontier where arbitrators are free to impose their own
brand of "industrial justice."
The phrase "industrial justice" by itself is not pejorative, but the
author linked it to an image of arbitrariness and lawlessness associated
with untamed frontiers. The brief did not belabor this metaphor;
however, it reminded readers of this image every time it named the
arbitrator, West, and every time it referred to West's "own brand of
industrial justice." Finally, both these reminders combined with a new
play on words at the beginning of the third subsection of the argument:
.... Arbitrator West also shot holes through another provision of
the [agreement], enforcing his own brand of "industrial justice."59
Notice that in the context of a metaphoric theme, the recurring
metaphor is unrelated to the doctrinal rule that governs the analysis of
the issue. In this example, for instance, the "Wild West" references are
unrelated to the rules governing the challenge to the arbitrator's
decision. If, by contrast, an issue is governed by a doctrinal metaphor,
recurring references to that metaphoric concept would not be a
metaphoric theme.6" Such references would merely be part of the
discussion and application of the metaphoric doctrinal rule. For
example, in an argument involving the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrinal metaphor, recurring references to the "fruit" metaphor would
not be a metaphoric theme; they would simply be part of the discussion
and application of the metaphoric rule. Thus, a metaphoric theme
involves recurring references to a metaphoric concept that is unrelated
to the doctrinal law under discussion.
Many of the textbooks on brief writing state that developing a theme
for the argument is a critical component of writing an effective legal
brief.6 A theme is a basic value or principle that underlies an advocate's position on an issue and that unifies all of the advocate's various
points on that issue.6 2 As one textbook explains,
A theme is a core value that the advocate wants the court to embrace
or recoil from. A theme is the preservation of a "good," such as
stability, trust, freedom, responsibility, and loyalty, or the prevention
of a "bad," such as abuse, laziness, recklessness, slippery slopes, and
open floodgates.

59.
60.
61.

Id. at 329-30 (footnotes omitted and brackets in original).
For a discussion of "doctrinal metaphors," see supra Part I.
See, e.g., CAROLE C. BERRY, EFFECTIvE APPELLATE ADVOCACY: BRIEF WRITING AND

ORAL ARGUMENT 77 (3d ed. 2003); CALLEROS, supra note 57, at 328-30; BRADLEY G. CLARY
ET AL., ADVOCACY ON APPEAL 6-9 (2d ed. 2004); MICHAEL R. FONTHAM ET AL., PERSUASIVE
WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTs 53-56 (2002).
62. E.g., CLARY ET AL., supra note 61, at 6; BERRY, supra note 61, at 77.
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A theme is not in itself a legal rule. A theme anchors the advocate's
argument in support or rejection of a legal rule.'
While a theme can be, and often is, presented in literal language, it
can also be combined with metaphor, as we saw in the above "Wild
West" example. In that motion for summary judgment, the advocate's
theme was the principle of preventing insurrection and the notion that
the arbitrator in question acted randomly and rebelliously. While the
advocate could have presented this theme with literal language, the
advocate instead decided to combine it with the metaphoric concept of a
lawless frontier. Metaphoric themes such as this not only offer the
benefits provided by all well-crafted themes-presenting a core value
and a unifying concept for the advocate's argument-but they also
provide the benefits of a well-crafted metaphor.
In other works, I have written extensively about the rhetorical
functions of originally crafted metaphors." While it is beyond the
scope of this Article to discuss them at length, the following is a
summary of the rhetorical benefits of crafting a theme in the form of a
metaphor:
. Logos Function: A metaphor, by definition, is an analogy. By
providing an apt metaphoric analogy, the writer helps to communicate the substance of his or her argument to the audience. 5
• Ethos Function: Aristotle once said that crafting an effective
metaphor is "a sign of genius." Presenting an original metaphoric
theme enhances the writer's credibility as an intelligent source of
information.6 7
• Pathos Function-Emotional Substance: A metaphoric theme
sets a mood for the argument" and evokes emotions associated
with the metaphoric concept. 69 In the "Wild West" example, for
instance, the metaphoric theme evokes the emotions associated with
frontier justice, such as fear and dread.
* Pathos Function-Medium Mood Control: Helping to avoid
boring a reader, a metaphoric theme in a brief can "amuse" a reader

63.

CLARY ET AL., supra note 61, at 6.
See SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 204-06.
65. See id. at 204.
66. ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S POETICS: A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY FOR STUDENTS
OF LITERATURE 41 (Leon Golden trans., Prentice Hall 1968), quoted in Michael Frost,
Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 LEGAL WRITING 113, 127 (1996).
67. See SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 206.
68. E.g., CALLEROS, supra note 57, at 329-30.
69. See SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 205-06.

64.
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and keep the reader interested and in a positive mood with regard
to how the brief is written. 0
. Rhetorical Style Function: Because of their clever and
unexpected nature, metaphoric references associated with a
metaphoric theme can draw attention to an advocate's argument
and can make it more memorable to the reader.7 '
As one can see, metaphoric themes serve numerous rhetorical
functions. Consequently, legal advocates should consider this strategy
in drafting their own briefs.
B.

Point-Specific Stylistic Metaphors

The second subcategory of stylistic metaphors is "point-specific stylistic
metaphor." The preceding section discussed the concept of a metaphoric
theme by which a legal writer in his or her argument makes several
recurring references to an underlying metaphoric theme. Point-specific
stylistic metaphors, by contrast, involve a legal writer employing a
stylistic metaphor in connection with communicating a single, specific
point in his or her argument. These, by far, are the most common forms
of stylistic metaphor in legal writing and are what most of the legal
writing books are 2referring to when they discuss metaphor as a
persuasive strategy.7
Point-specific stylistic metaphors come in a variety of forms. The most
elaborate form entails a legal writer communicating a specific point in
his or her argument by employing a lengthy metaphoric analogy that can
span several sentences or even paragraphs. Consider this example:
A metaphor may better illuminate the distinction between contending
evidence is irrelevant to prove a claim as opposed to asserting that
sufficient evidence was not adduced to prove such claim. Assume that
the pieces of two jigsaw puzzles, one of a horse and the other of a ship,
were inadvertently commingled. Assume further that we are concerned
only with putting together the horse puzzle. By raising a relevancy
contention, the objector is effectively claiming that the puzzle builder
is using a piece from the ship puzzle to build the horse puzzle. The
ship piece does not belong there. A sufficiency of the evidence
contention, on the other hand, effectively states that, while the puzzle

70. See id. at 206.
71. See id.
72. See generally id. at 179-221; see also, e.g., ANNE ENQUIST & LAUREL CURRIE OATES,
JUST WRITING: GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE FOR THE LEGAL WRITER 171-72 (2d ed.
2005); BRYAN A. GARNER, THE ELEMENTS OF LEGAL STYLE 149-51 (2d ed. 2002); LOUIS J.
SIRICO, JR. & NANCY L. ScHuLTz, PERSUASIVE WRITING FOR LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION app. A (2d ed. 2001).

20071

2LEVELS OF METAPHOR

builder has used only horse pieces to assemble the horse puzzle, the
picture is not yet complete.7
In this excerpt, the legal writer, Judge Glenn Harrell, Jr. of the
Maryland Court of Appeals, is communicating one specific point within
his opinion: the difference between "irrelevant" evidence and "insufficient" evidence. To communicate this point, Judge Harrell employs a
lengthy metaphoric analogy involving commingled jigsaw puzzles of a
horse and a ship.
At the other end of the spectrum of point-specific stylistic metaphors
are single-word stylistic metaphors whereby a writer uses a single
metaphoric word in an effort to communicate his or her point more
forcefully. 4 Consider these examples in the context of judicial opinion
writing (the metaphoric word is italicized in each example):7"
- "Crimes committed because of the perpetrator's hatred of the
race, color, religion or national origin of the victim have the obvious
tendency to ignite further violence by provoking retaliatory crimes
and inciting community unrest."76
* "To permit the present sense impression exception to apply to
overheard conversations, such as in the instant case, would in effect
permit this exception to substantially devour the entire hearsay rule
of exclusion."77
- At the other end of the spectrum of constitutional errors lie
"structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which
defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards." The existence of such
defects-deprivation of the right to counsel, for example-requires
automatic reversal of the conviction because they infect the entire
78
trial process.
. "Drug dealing is particularly corrosive to the well-being of
79
Idaho communities."
. Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the
complete story of the crime,. . . evidence or testimony may be given
even though it may reveal or suggest other crimes. These holdings

73. This illustration was taken from SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at
200 (quoting Anderson v. Litzenberg, 694 A.2d 150, 161 n.11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)).
74. See id. at 198-200.
75. These illustrations were taken from id. at 198-99.
76. State v. Vanatter, 869 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Mo. 1994) (emphasis added).
77. Estate of Parks v. O'Young, 682 N.E.2d 466, 471 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (emphasis
added).
78. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30 (1993) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
79. State v. Devore, 2 P.3d 153, 158 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added).
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are made necessary by the danger that, otherwise, testimony by the
witnesses for the prosecution too carefully manicured might lead
alert jurors to the thought that something of importance was being
withheld. Such suspicions on the part of jurors could lead to a
mischievous miscarriage of justice.8"
"[Plaintiff] takes issue with the defendants' use of the
McDonnell Douglas test and cites a ragbag of cases in apparent
support of the proposition that the test is inapplicable here.
Because her argument 81is so poorly developed, however, we are
entitled to disregard it."
In each of these examples, the writer makes an effort to communicate
his or her point more forcefully by inserting a single metaphoric word.
This is the most basic form of stylistic metaphor.
In between lengthy metaphoric analogies and single metaphoric words
are stylistic metaphoric sentences.
Stylistic metaphoric sentences
involve a writer communicating a specific point by weaving or otherwise
fully integrating metaphoric language into a sentence or a group of
related sentences.8 2 Consider these examples: 8
. "IT]he work of the Alabama Legislature in the area of medical
liability is a mule-the bastard offspring of intercourse among
lawyers, legislators, and lobbyists, having no pride of ancestry and
no hope of posterity."'
. "[C]onspiracy... [is the] darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery." 5
• If the small claims court is to be the "People's Court," it must
not be encumbered with rules and restrictions which can only
frustrate and hinder the litigant who resorts to that court in
response to its promise of speedy and economical justice. In the case
of inexperienced pro se litigants, it is better to err on the side of
admitting an ore-heap of evidence in the belief that nuggets of truth
may be found amidst the dross, rather than to confine the parties to
presenting assayed and refined matter which qualifies as pure gold
under the rules of evidence.8 6

80. McFee v. State, 511 So. 2d 130, 139 (Miss. 1987) (Robertson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
81. Emerson v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 707 F. Supp. 336, 338 n.1 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (emphasis added).
82. SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 192.
83. These examples of stylistic metaphoric sentences are taken from id. at 181-82.
84. Hayes v. Luckey, 33 F. Supp. 2d 987, 995 n. 16 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
85. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
86. Houghtaling v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855, 860 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
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. "[P]arties to a preliminary agreement may not provide that
they do not intend to be bound until the transaction is buttoned up
by a more detailed and formal agreement. There is commercial
utility to allowing persons to hug before they marry." 7
- "[Evidence] should not be admitted ...where the minute peg
of relevancy will be entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung upon
8
it."
-"[Elach [oppressive] practice is one wire in a birdcage; while
no one wire could prevent the bird's escape, the wires woven
together make a thoroughly effective prison." 9
In all of these examples, the writers communicate their points by
weaving metaphoric language with literal language in their sentences.90
Metaphoric sentences such as these are what many people think of when
they hear of the use of metaphor as a stylistic strategy.91
Related to point-specific stylistic metaphors are extended stylistic
metaphors. Extended stylistic metaphors occur when a writer builds on
an initial stylistic metaphor by subsequently employing related
metaphoric references.9 2 Consider this example, which discusses the
use of an extended stylistic metaphor in the Fifth Circuit case of Shanley
98
v.Northeast IndianaSchool District:
In Shanley, the court held that, under the First Amendment, a school
board did not have the right to prevent high school students from
distributing an underground newspaper near a school. In the case, the
court had to balance the rights of school boards to establish school
disciplinary policies with the students' First Amendment rights of
freedom of expression. The court relied on a previous Supreme Court
case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District
[393 U.S. 503 (1969)], which established guidelines for balancing
constitutional rights against the rights and duties of school officials.

87. Goren v. Royal Invs., Inc., 516 N.E.2d 173, 176 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987).
88. State v. Goebel, 218 P.2d 300, 306 (Wash. 1950).
89. Louise M. Antony, Back to Androgeny: What Bathrooms Can Teach Us About
Equality, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 4 (1998) (attributing the origin of this metaphor
to MARILYN FRYE, Oppression, in THE POLITICS OF REALITY 1 (1983)).
90. Stylistic metaphoric sentences also include "pure" metaphoric sentences, which
contain only metaphoric language (and no literal language) and rely on their context to
complete the metaphoric analogy. See SMITH, The Power of Metaphor,supra note 4, at 19295.
91. By far, metaphoric sentences such as these make up most of the examples of
metaphor in legal writing literature. See, e.g., ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 72, at 171;
GARNER, supra note 72, at 149-51; SIRICO & SCHULTZ, supra note 72, at app. A.
92. SMrrH, The Power of Metaphor,supra note 4, at 201-03.
93. 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Writing for the majority in Shanley, Judge Goldberg compared Tinker
to a "dam":
"71nker's dam to school board absolutism does not leave dry the
fields of school discipline. This court has gone a considerable
distance with the school boards to uphold its disciplinary fiats
where reasonable. TInker simply irrigates, rather than floods, the
fields of school discipline. It sets canals and channels through
which school discipline might flow with the least possible damage
to the nation's priceless topsoil of the First Amendment."
[In this excerpt,] Judge Goldberg's initial metaphor of a "dam" is
extended into several related metaphors: "irrigates," "floods,"
"fields of school discipline," "canals and channels," and "topsoil of
the First Amendment." Rather than making one metaphoric
comparison, Judge Goldberg makes several, all revolving around
a single theme: farm irrigation."'
A writer can employ a stylistic metaphor either by creating an apt
metaphor on his or her own or by borrowing (i.e., quoting) a stylistic
metaphor that was previously created by someone else. Not surprisingly, however, more rhetorical benefits are gained by creating an original
metaphor than by borrowing pre-existing metaphoric language. When
a writer crafts an original metaphor, he or she benefits from the
standard rhetorical functions of metaphor that were previously discussed
in connection with metaphoric themes.9 5 These benefits include (1) the
logos function of providing an analogy that helps communicate the
substance of the writer's point, (2) the ethos function of establishing the
writer as a credible and intelligent source of information, (3) the pathos
functions of evoking favorable emotions, and (4) the rhetorical style
function of drawing attention and emphasis to the writer's point."
While many of these same functions are served when a writer borrows
a pre-existing stylistic metaphor, the ethos function is not as great.
Incorporating pre-existing metaphoric language into one's writing
demonstrates resourcefulness, which is an indication of credibility.
However, as was discussed earlier, crafting an original metaphor is a

94. SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 202 (quoting Shanley, 462 F.2d at
978 (citation omitted) and citing BOSMAJIAN, Personifying Justice, the Constitution, and
JudicialOpinions, in METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 167,181-82 (1992) and

Michael Frost, Greco-Roman Analysis of MetaphoricReasoning, 2 LEGAL WRITING 113,12830 (1996)). Extended metaphors such as this are often discouraged by writing experts.
See, e.g., BOSMAJIAN, supra, at 181 (criticizing this "Tinker dam" extended metaphor as
"[bringing] too much attention to itself"); BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN
LEGAL USAGE 559-60 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing "overwrought metaphor[s]").
95. See supra notes'64-71 and accompanying text.
96. SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 204-06.
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sign of genius.9 7 Consequently, when a writer crafts an original
metaphor, the writer demonstrates more emphatically that he or she is
an intelligent, and therefore credible, source of information.98
Another issue regarding the use of pre-existing stylistic metaphors is
the concern over avoiding trite and clich6 metaphors. Many metaphor
experts stress that legal writers should avoid using clich6 metaphoric
language such as "fishing expedition,"' "woven into the fabric of our
society,"'0 0 "wolf in sheep's clothing,"'0 ' "wheels of justice grind,"0 2
"parade of horribles,"0 3 and the like. Thus, if a legal writer is going
to "borrow" a metaphor, the writer would be well advised to borrow a
particularly clever and unique one. For those legal writers who would
like to try their hand at creating an original stylistic metaphor but fear
they lack the natural talent or experience, I have elsewhere set out
specific tips and guidelines for crafting these stylistic devices.'
Such
guidelines are beyond the scope of this Article.0 "
Two final points are in order about the relationship between stylistic
metaphors (Level 3) and doctrinal metaphors (Level 1). First, the former
can become the latter. If a legal advocate creates an effective metaphor
and uses that metaphor to communicate a legal point in his or her brief,
it is possible that the court will pick up that metaphor and repeat it in
a published opinion. If subsequent courts and lawyers continue to
employ that metaphor for that particular legal concept, it is also possible
for the metaphor to become the rule governing the analysis of that
issue-to wit, a doctrinal metaphor. This process is also possible for a
judge who crafts an effective metaphor of his or her own in a judicial
opinion. An example of the birth of a doctrinal metaphor can be seen in
the 1939 United States Supreme Court opinion, Nardone v. United
States,"° the case in which the Court first used the phrase "fruit of the
poisonous tree" to describe evidence derived from an initial illegal
act.'0 7 The stylistic metaphoric phrase used by the Court in Nardone

97. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
98. SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 206.
99. See Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Just Say "No Fishing":The Lure of Metaphor, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 1-3 (2006).
100. See ENQUIST & OATES, supra note 72, at 171.
101. See id.
102. See JANE N. RICHMOND, LEGAL WRITING: FORM AND FUNCTION 117 (2002).
103. See SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 191.
104. Id. at 217-21.
105. For further discussion of creating an original stylistic metaphor, see Chapter 9 of
SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 179-221.
106. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
107. Id. at 341. For further discussion, see Diana, supra note 16, at 986 n.8.
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was quickly picked up and repeated by numerous subsequent courts.'08
Today this metaphor is the primary tool for analyzing this issue of
evidentiary law." 9
Second, because judges can employ both doctrinal metaphors and
stylistic metaphors in their judicial opinions, there can be confusion
between the two in this context. Every metaphor used by a judge in an
opinion is not a doctrinal metaphor even though the metaphor is being
used in a judicial opinion, which is a form of primary legal authority.
Doctrinal metaphors, in fact, are much rarer than stylistic metaphors in
all contexts, including judicial opinions. Most of the metaphors used by
judges in writing their opinions, be they original metaphors or preexisting, borrowed metaphors, are simply stylistic choices designed to
add rhetorical power to the opinions. In fact, nearly all of the examples
of stylistic metaphors set out in this section were written by judges in
the context of published judicial opinions. By contrast, a judicial opinion
contains a doctrinal metaphor only when a relevant doctrinal rule
discussed in
the opinion in and of itself is expressed in metaphoric
0
language."
IV.

LEVEL FOUR: INHERENT METAPHORS

The fourth level of metaphor relevant to legal analysis and writing is
"inherent metaphor." In recent years, much has been written in the
fields of cognitive psychology, linguistics, and philosophy that demonstrates that metaphor is fundamental to the way people make sense of
and interact with the world. These works indicate that far from simply
being a rhetorical tool occasionally employed by persuasive and creative
writers, metaphor is a natural and inherent component of human
language."'
One of the most well known of these works is the book "Metaphors We
Live By."" 2 As the title suggests, this book points out that metaphoric
language is all around us even if much of it goes unnoticed. Consider
this example regarding the words "up" and "down," which have many
metaphoric uses in every day language:
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOwN: I'm feeling up. That boosted my spirits.
My spirits rose. You're in high spirits. Thinking about her always

108.
109.
110.
111.

See generally Diana, supra note 16.
See generally id.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

112.

GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIvE BY (1980).
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gives me a lift. I'm feeling down. I'm depressed. He's really low these
days. I fell into a depression. My spirits sank.
CONSCIOUS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUS IS DOwN: Get up. Wake up. I'm

up already. He rises early in the morning. He fell asleep. He dropped
off to sleep. He's under hypnosis. He sank into a coma.
HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE DOWN: He's

at the peak of health. Lazarus rose from the dead. He's in top shape.
As to his health, he's way up there. He fell ill. He's sinking fast. He
came down with the flu. His health is declining. He dropped dead.
HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR

FORCE IS DOWN: I have control over her. I am on top of the situation.
He's in a superiorposition. He's at the height of his power. He's in the
high command. He's in the upper echelon. His power rose. He ranks
above me in strength. He is under my control. He fell from power.
His power is onthe decline. He is my social inferior. He is low man
on the totem pole." 3
As is true of all language, inherent metaphors exist in legal language.
Many words regularly used in legal discourse -such as "higher court"
and "going forward with a motion"-are metaphoric in nature even
though they are rarely thought of as such."4
So, you may be asking yourself, how is the concept of inherent
metaphor relevant or important to legal advocacy? Granted, inherent
metaphors, as natural and automatic components of language, do not
implicate specific rhetorical strategies for legal advocates like the other
levels of metaphor we have discussed. Nevertheless, knowledge about
inherent metaphor is important to legal advocates. The scholarship in
this area explores the foundations of metaphor within the human brain
and how metaphor-making is a fundamental cognitive function. If legal
advocates really want to understand how metaphors function as
rhetorical tools, they should study the cognitive foundations of metaphor.
Understanding metaphor's basis in cognition can help legal advocates
understand metaphor's rhetorical power. And understanding the source
of metaphor's power can lead to better skills in using that power.

113. Id. at 15. These are just a few of the metaphoric uses of the concepts of "up" and
"down" that are discussed by Professors Lakoff and Johnson. See id. at 15-17.
114. See, e.g., Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 5, at 2231-32.
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CONCLUSION

Although much has been written in recent years about metaphor in
the law, many of these works seem to talk past one another."5 This
apparent disconnect is due in part to the fact that many of these works
are actually discussing different types of metaphor within legal discourse
without acknowledging or perhaps even realizing that this is so. This
Article attempts to help rectify some of this confusion by identifying, as
an organizational scheme, four different "levels" of metaphor relevant to
legal analysis and writing implicated by the existing literature.
The second goal of this Article is to discuss the specific implications of
these various levels of metaphor on the practice of persuasive legal
writing. Ever since it was first explored by the classical rhetoricians of
the Greco-Roman era, metaphor has been viewed as an important source
of persuasive power."' The modern interdisciplinary scholarship on
metaphor has done nothing to minimize this view. In fact, as we have
seen in this Article, recent revelations about metaphor have only
enhanced its potential as a source of strategies for legal advocates.

115. See infra app. A.
116. E.g., SMITH, The Power of Metaphor, supra note 4, at 179, 204-06.
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